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Xara´: Namesakes in Southern Mozambique
and Bahia (Brazil)
Joa˜o de Pina-Cabral
University of Lisbon, Portugal
abstract In Maputo (Southern Mozambique) and Bahia (Brazil), the most commonly
used word to refer to namesakes is xara´ – a word of Amerindian origin. Although the
institutions in question diverge considerably in each of these contexts, the two usages
come together in that the sharing of a personal name establishes an alliance not only
between the two persons involved but also among their relations. In this way, it is
argued that the namesake institution is both supervening upon filiation and is a way
of closing the local universe of relatedness upon itself. By superimposing a set of cross-
ing ties, the namesake institution consolidates the entities at play and their relations.
Nevertheless, much like filiation, upon which it is dependent, the namesake relation is
one of co-responsibility and fusion between the partners, not of reciprocal responsibil-
ity. The latter is the product of the triangulation that such relations of alliance produce.
keywords Relatedness, person, alliance, namesakes, Mozambique, Brazil
One of the more recurrent aspects of personal naming in the ethno-graphic record is the way in which homonymy – be it of a firstname or another kind of name, be it desired or a chance event – is
used in many societies around the world as the basis for establishing a recogniz-
able relation of close identification between the persons in question, the name-
sakes. In this paper, I propose to address such practices as institutions – that is,
sets of principles and categories that interact in a structured manner so as to
produce recognizable patterns of cognition and behaviour with general social
implications.
Personal names, both as sound patterns and as written signs, are objectifica-
tions. That is, as inscriptions of processes of personhood in the world they play
the role of technological and cultural props for thinking. Thus, much like
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pronouns, they sit at the core of the processes of personal and collective engage-
ment with the world for they contribute centrally towards the determination of
perspectives of interest (cf. Pina-Cabral 2010b or Johnston 2010:308–9). Some
contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently argued that
this is not simply a sociological phenomenon, as we have been trained to
believe in terms of standard twentieth century notions of semiotic represen-
tation. We must heed their suggestion that ‘Mind [. . .] is congenitally predis-
posed to seep out into the world’ (Clark 2006:8). Such objectifications as
names, therefore, can be seen to have deep cognitive implications as they
play a central role in processes of distributed cognitive architecture. Personal
names – and their repetition, as in namesakes or in patterns of name serializa-
tion – are central aspects of what Clark and Chalmers (1998:9) call ‘socially
extended cognition’.
While namesakes have not received all that much theoretical attention in
anthropological literature,1 institutions of this kind are very prevalent in the eth-
nographic register and they are closely associated to the history of the concepts
that have guided our discipline throughout the past centuries: filiation, classifi-
catory terminologies, relations of alliance, joking relationships, twinship, reci-
procity, etc. One of the locus classicus of these debates is Junod’s (1962 (1927))
ethnography of the peoples of Southern Mozambique that inspired Radcliffe-
Brown’s (1952 (1940 and 1949)) essays on joking relationships; which, in turn,
were central inspirations for all social and cultural anthropologists throughout
the mid-twentieth century. While these essays were written in explicit dialogue
with Mauss’ (2000 (1923/1924)) writings on reciprocity, they subsequently influ-
enced in a decisive manner, even if by contrast, Le´vi-Strauss’ (1949, 1974 (1945))
formulations of alliance theory.
It is particularly interesting, therefore, to find out that, in Southern Mozam-
bique today, the most commonly used word to refer to this institution, with
such deep roots both in local history and in anthropological history, is the
recently arrived Amerindian word xara´.2 The paper follows the trace of these
namesake institutions, taking recourse to ethnographic material from Southern
Mozambique3 and from Bahia (Brazil), where I have been carrying out research
on naming practices since 2004.4
Upon finding that there are aspects that these institutions share and that are
similar to institutions in the Iberian Peninsula (cf. Pina-Cabral 1986), the paper
follows David Webster’s argument that these are relations of alliance. It is
suggested that the namesake institution is superimposed upon filiation in the
early history of the person through a process of triangulation – the word
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retaining here its original meaning in geometry: the determination of the
location of a point by relating it to two others. I am influenced by Donald
Davidson’s (2001) work where triangulation describes the process through
which beliefs about oneself, beliefs about others, and beliefs about the world
come into existence jointly. Thus, Le´vi-Strauss’ (1974 (1945)) arguments con-
cerning the role of the mother’s brother in alliance are seen as a type of triangu-
lation, that is, the related entities come into existence by a mutual relation to a
third entity that constitutes a necessary point of differentiation.
It is argued that these relations of triangulation that occur in the person’s
early life lead both to consolidation of personhood and to consolidation of
the local universe of relatedness. That is, I adopt a view of kinship relations
that frees them from the Fortesian biologistic mould of the elementary family
(cf. Carsten 2004), thus including alliance relations within the general category
of kinship – contrary to the time-honoured British practice of separating ‘mar-
riage’ from ‘kinship’ – thereby approximating it to the use of the French/Iberian
words parente´/parentesco.
I start the paper by proposing the notion of namesake as the axis for a com-
parative trajectory. Such a notion, however, is hardly of itself a concept that can
stand outside of history. In short, the very notion that makes it possible to trace
a path through the argument is itself part of the argument. My use of the notion
of namesake, therefore, is strategic. I employ it as a heuristic device, an instru-
ment that allows me to connect things that otherwise might appear foreign
to each other. In this way, ‘namesake’ becomes an intermediate category in the
sense of a category that I use in order to propose an analysis and that I may
well want to discard when I go on to discuss other arrangements of sociocul-
tural events.5 Neither am I arguing that the notion of namesake inheres in the
institutions described, nor do I deny that there are many things in common
between them that the concept captures. To the contrary of both, I aim to
use the notion of namesake in order to bring out similarities that the people
of Southern Mozambique and Bahia themselves identify. But I am fully aware
that, as I do so, I participate in the creation of yet another register of sociality
with a history of its own – social science.
On the one hand, the category is intermediate to the extent that it depends
on other categories that have a similar sort of status, themselves subject to re-
definition and re-analysis. In this particular case, I have leaned heavily on the
categories of the person, of personal name, and of filiation. Without them,
nothing of what I will describe would make much sense. On the other hand,
however, the anthropological use of the notion of namesake has a long


































history. The category mediates my relation to this history. As I developed the
argument, this history came to impinge more and more on what I wrote and I
found it increasingly difficult not to hear the historical echoes of my very words.
That history too is in a way ‘cultural’ and marks a historical process of consti-
tution of a universalistic type of language of which this paper hopes to be a part.
The xara´ in Maputo
In Southern Mozambique, as is so often the case in our contemporary globa-
lized world, kinship systems with divergent histories cohabit, interacting crea-
tively while concomitantly maintaining some of their internal coherence. In
her recent study of poor families in suburban Maputo,6 Be´nard da Costa
(2002) observes that, apart from what they call their nome de registo (registry
name), people also have a nome tradicional (traditional name) which, according
to her informants, was often the name of ‘an ancestor’ (p. 129 n 71). This ‘tra-
ditional name’ may be obtained either directly, as when an older member of
the family decides to give their first name to a child (often to a grandchild of
the same sex); or indirectly, as when the family decides to give the child the
name of someone else. The eponym7 may either be a friend of the family or,
as is often the case, a recently deceased grandparent.
The norm in Southern Mozambique is for people to accumulate a series of names
(polyonomastics). According to Be´nard da Costa: ‘there are two types of names
that may be ‘inherited’, which are not mutually exclusive: the ‘traditional name’, nor-
mally in the Shangaan language or another of the local languages, and the ‘Portu-
guese’ name, also called ‘registry name’ or ‘official name’.8 A child, therefore, may
be given two first names [nomes pro´prios] which identify her simultaneously with (at
least) two members of the family: for example, she may be called ‘x’ like her live
grandmother and ‘y’ like that grandmother is also called or like her great-great-grand-
mother was called’ (Be´nard da Costa 2002:172).9
Sharing a name with an older member of the family, whether alive or dead,
involves more than simple remembrance (a quotation, so to speak) since it
implies that the named person assumes in attenuated form the relational attri-
butes of the eponym. Concerning a grandchild who was about to be born, a
widow told Be´nard da Costa (2002:171): ‘I would love it if my grandchild
were male, so he could be my husband; for me to have a husband’. In short,
one may be given the name of a live person, to whom one becomes a kind of
double, or one may be given the name of the deceased relative of a third
person, and assume some of the relational attributes of the deceased. Note
ethnos, vol. 75:3, september 2010 (pp. 323–345)

































that, as will be further clarified below, the child ‘is’ the husband only in an atte-
nuated or secondary fashion.
As it happens, the system is highly dynamic since, in contexts of crisis resol-
ution, people are prone to add new names to their list of first names. Polyono-
mastics, furthermore, allows for a sequential play on interpersonal referrals,
which means that, as a result of naming, the person accumulates a number of
identifications (a) with other persons, (b) with the situations that caused the
name attribution (namely crisis situations), and (c) with third parties to
whom the name giver was associated. A female informant told Be´nard da Costa:
‘I am called V F D10 because I was very sick. This name came as a result of my being
baptized in the Catholic Church when I was 15. In church, they would not accept my
name R., that was the name of my xara´ [namesake], who was my aunt, my father’s
sister. My traditional name is C. There are people who call me R.; my husband
calls me V. but, when he is happy, he calls me C’ (Be´nard da Costa 2002:172).
Yet another case is VS, a widow in Maputo who earns a reasonable living in
petty commerce. Upon her husband’s death, she refused to go back to the coun-
tryside to take up home with her brother-in-law (in Jangano, Inhambane). This
refusal of the expected levirate created bad feelings between her and the hus-
band’s relatives and they have not yet allowed her ‘to say mass11 for her
husband’, saying that someone in the family may die if she does so – which
is an indirect hint at a witchcraft accusation, so as to prevent her from breaking
away from their family by remarriage.
She keeps a machamba (a plot) in Inhambane and pays her relatives up there
to farm it, for she has a child living there with her mother-in-law. This child is
her father-in-law’s namesake. He has been living there since he was weaned.
‘When I make some money, I always send it there, as I have a child there;
and also for them. I cannot fail to help them and, in turn, from Inhambane,
they send me things’. Her other child is her own father’s namesake and lives
with her mother. ‘My mother likes to stay with her husband’s namesake’.
Indeed, her in-laws’ feelings of suspicion seem to be justified, for she confessed
to the ethnographer: ‘if I had to choose between [my husband’s family] and my
mother, I would rather help my mother. I always buy soap and ‘calamities’
[cheap clothing] to help her out [. . .] I feel I belong more to my mother’s
family’ (Be´nard da Costa 2002:111– 12).
In spite of all the changes that have taken place in Southern Mozambique
during the intervening century, the namesake institution that we see at work


































in these examples overlaps significantly with that which was first described by
Henri-Alexandre Junod in his famous ethnographic monograph of the Tsonga/
Thonga.12 One of the four modes of naming a child that Junod identified was
when
. . . somebody asks the favour of giving his name to the new-born child; a friend of the
family may do so, but it is also often a traveller who happens to be in the village to
whom this privilege is accorded. He will name himself in the child (ku titshula ka
nwana). This fact will establish a special relation between this person and the
child, a relation which bears close resemblance to that of a godfather to his
godson. Once a year he will come and give ‘his name’ (viz. the child) presents.
When the child is able to travel, the mother will go with him to pay a visit to his
‘friend in name’ (mabitoku-lobye). (Junod 1962 (1927), I:38–9).13
The nyadine as Alliance
By far the best description of the namesake institution for Southern Mozam-
bique, however, is that provided by Webster (2009) in his ethnography of the
Chope carried out from 1967 to 1976 (esp. pp. 213–48). In xichope (the local
language) people of the same name call each other nyadine.
In early life, a young child is brought up and nurtured by his parents. But shortly after
birth, a naming ritual takes place, in which the child is named after some other person,
usually living (as opposed to deceased ancestors). This inter vivos name-giving gives
rise to an alliance between the parents and the donor of the name which is a form of
ritual co-parentship. But the custom also has implications for the child, for he [or she]
now has two sets of parents, one actual, one ritual, and is expected, after the age of
about five, to live with his [or her] namesake, who may live some distance away
from the parental home. (Webster 2009:67)
In those days, the namesake institution was very prevalent in Chopeland.
About 63% of the households Webster (2009:87) studied had at least one name-
sake in residence. Typically, a household with five children had sent away two
to be raised by their namesakes and received in turn two namesakes (Webster
2009:153). In fact, 57% of the 160 persons he interviewed on the subject had spent
part of their childhood in their nyadine’s household (Webster 2009:220).
Forty-two per cent of the namesakes were agnatic relatives of each other; the
majority of the remainder being affines and maternal relatives. A majority of
eponyms (76%) were of the ‘inward-looking type’ – that is, they already
belonged to the local universe of relatedness before the naming ritual. Only
13% of the children were given the name of a deceased ancestor (Webster
ethnos, vol. 75:3, september 2010 (pp. 323–345)

































2009:240); while around 20% were given the name of a grandparent or a classi-
ficatory grandparent (Webster 2009:224).
Note that Chope as well as the remaining peoples of Southern Mozambique
and the Low Velt that Junod grouped under the general category Tsonga (or
Thonga) have an Omaha-type kinship terminology which means that the
mother’s brother is classified as ‘grandfather’ (koko) and the sister’s son as ‘grand-
child’ (ntukulu). In his classic essay on the topic, Radcliffe-Brown (1952 (1940))
calls this terminological identification between the mother’s side of the family
and the alternate generation a ‘legal fiction’ (p. 99), and goes on to propose
one of his three ‘structural principles’ of kinship: the principle of the unity of
alternate generations (Radcliffe-Brown 1952 (1941):87).14 ‘Grandparents and
grandchildren’, he argues referring once again to Junod’s ethnography, ‘are
persons with whom one can be on free and easy terms. This is connected
with an extremely widespread, indeed almost universal, way of organizing the
relation of alternate generations to one another’ (Radcliffe-Brown 1952 (1941):9).
At the naming ceremony, and after consultation of a bone diviner (nyatish-
lolo), the child is given a ‘name of the bones’, composed by adding a suffix to
the name of his nyadine. In fact, Webster (2009:215) follows Junod in stating
that if the first consultation does not confirm their choice, the parents are
likely to go to another diviner in order to get the confirmation they need.
The eponym, as much as the child, has a number of names and the name
that is given is usually not his or her own ‘name of the bones’ but rather the
more intimate name, normally given informally by his or her own mother, or
alternatively, in the case of males, the name adopted at the time of circumcision.
What this means is that, as a rule, a child does not receive the name of the
nyadine’s own nyadine, thus stressing the intransitive nature of the relation of
namesake.
Webster’s ethnography is particularly valuable in the way he demonstrates
how the nyadine/xara´ institution functions structurally as a mode of alliance
within the social universe of the Chope – in this way, in fact, he follows a
lead already present in Radcliffe-Brown (1952 (1940):102). Men who were
raised in their namesake’s household are prone to develop close links with
those relatives and, on marriage, pressure is placed upon them to settle close
to their nyadine’s home, thus joining their vicinality and reinforcing their politi-
cal clout. This has the effect of spreading kinship links laterally and breaking up
agnatic group cohesion, since over half of the namesakes were either maternal
relatives or parents’ friends. In this way, agnatic links are countered, matrilateral
links reinforced, and alliances based on friendship prolonged; thus producing


































the ‘individualist’ and mobile atmosphere that Webster finds characteristic of
the Chope sociality.
In his perceptive analysis, Webster (2009) states that:
The namesake syndrome is composed of a trio of dyadic relationships: those between
parent and child, between child and namesake, and between parent and child’s name-
sake. The last mentioned of the three is, at the outset, the most important of the
dyads. It is here that the alliance is cemented: the child, after all, is a helpless non-
entity at the naming ceremony. The real purpose of the institution at this stage is
the strengthening of an existing bond, or the creation of a new one, which takes
place on the level of senior generations and can be seen as a dyadic contract. (p. 234)
This formulation of the institution as one of creative triangulation is
especially valuable for our analysis. However, the teleological explanation
(‘real purpose’) is less satisfactory as well as the correlate adoption of the
concept of ‘individual’. This has implications that we are bound to reject as it
leads inevitably to a polarization of the relations Webster describes, attributing
to them a characteristically dyadic and contractual aspect that the ethnographic
evidence does not seem to corroborate.
In the course of the naming ceremony, the child becomes an ‘entity’, to use
Webster’s words. This effect is produced by means of a merging of the child’s
budding identity with that of the eponym. In other words, the latter and the
child are thereafter somehow treated as being the same. Thus, the eponym is
said to ‘name himself [or herself]’ in the child; when he or she gives a present
to the child, they are said to give a present to ‘his [or her] name’; and, finally,
their relational attributes are inherited by the child in an attenuated or second-
ary fashion.
In short, the acts of maternal and paternal filiation that marked the child’s
initial socialization are thus, crossed by a new identification. As will be
further argued below, these three relations (maternal filiation, paternal filiation
and the namesake relation) are relations of close, open-ended identification.
Contrary to what Webster and the dominant anthropological tradition in the
twentieth century both maintained, these are not relations of reciprocity
between fully identified ‘individuals’. Rather, they are what gives rise to the
child’s personhood; that is, his or her entity status within a human (sociocul-
tural) world of relatedness.
In this way, the nyadine/xara´ institution in Southern Mozambique approxi-
mates many of the features that have been identified for the co-parentship insti-
tution (compadrio) in Catholic Europe and Latin America (cf. Pitt-Rivers
ethnos, vol. 75:3, september 2010 (pp. 323–345)

































1977:48–70; Pina-Cabral 1986:116– 19). It is significant that this similarity is ident-
ified by all three of our ethnographic sources (Junod, Webster and Be´nard da
Costa). Indeed, much like compadrio, the namesake institution crosses the
links between the parents and the child (the bonds of filiation that first
defined the child’s social persona) by superimposing upon them a transversal
bond with a third party. This triangulation counters the original relationships
of fusion – as it identifies, it differentiates. It reinforces the child’s social
persona (its entity status) by linking it with parties outside the immediate house-
hold of birth. In this way, the namesake institution can be seen to operate much
in the same way as incest prohibitions and exogamic rules in Le´vi-Strauss’ (1974
(1945):37–62) classic formulation of alliance. What we see here is the nature of
an entity (the child’s personhood) being defined by the relations that create it,
rather than the relations being defined by the entity.
Webster’s notion that, in Southern Mozambique, the concept of alliance
should be extended to include the institutions of namesake and of formal friend-
ship ought in my opinion to be taken seriously. He argues:
If both marriage and the namesake institution are kinds of alliance, then their differ-
ences must be of interest. Exogamy rules demand that an individual should not marry
into the clan of either his father or mother; the alliances are thus spread widely, and a
man may marry a woman he scarcely knows, or has never met. The introspective
‘naming’ (i.e. within ego’s existing kin and social network), however, operates in
the opposite way: if the exogamy rules make their resulting alliances centrifugal,
then this type of naming has a centripetal effect on the pattern of alliances. The name-
sake institution, then, can, and usually does, take place within the very kin groups pro-
scribed for marriage; it performs the functions of bonding inside the two clans that
marriage performs outside. (Webster 2009: 235)
Note, however, that Webster (2009) appends here the following footnote:
The ‘outward-looking’ namesake type, of course, has much the same effect
(structurally) as a marriage alliance (p. 235).
Seen as types of alliance within a notion of kinship as relatedness, the name-
sake institutions contrast with matrimonial alliance in one central aspect: they
are essentially intransitive, they create non-repetitive links. By forcing people to
look for filiation partners outside the ambit of their closer kin, incest prohibi-
tions and exogamy rules institute a breach within the process of human repro-
duction that opens it up as a field of circulation of people and, thus, of
communication.15 By contrast, the namesake institutions function as a way in
which the local system of relatedness closes in upon itself. This is why they


































are characteristically associated with the principle of identity between alternate
generations. It is no surprise that Radcliffe-Brown’s (1952 [1940] and [1941])
famous formulation of the principle should have resulted from a reading of
Junod’s ethnography. Therefore, it is relevant that, although neither the
nyadine/xara´ nor co-parentship are limited to relations between alternate gen-
erations (being open to integrate friends, patrons, other relatives, strangers,
etc.), both seem to depend a lot on it in practical terms.
Xara´s and Compadres
As it happens, in Maputo, the association between the historical institution
of nyadine/xara´ and European notions of co-parentship is explicit. This is how
Be´nard da Costa (2002) observed it:
It is said in SouthernMozambique (at least) that two persons with the same first name
are xara´s of each other. Often, the godfather or the godmother (or those who are
chosen to name a child) give their own first name to their godchildren and thus
become their xara´s. In consequence, people at times talk of ‘godfather’ and ‘xara´’ as
synonyms even when there is no repetition of the name. In principle, being someone’s
xara´ is a matter of some importance, as an identification occurs between the name and
the person. (p. 111 n63)
In fact, the two institutions have a lot in common.When the institution of co-
parentshipwas fully operational in Portugal, it wasmost common for godparents
to give their own name to the child thus conjoining alternate generations.16
Furthermore, much like the nyadine/xara´ relationship in Mozambique, it was
conceived of as a secondary relationship (a ‘ritual’ or ‘spiritual’ kinship) that
altered or qualified the already established relationship of filiation. Finally, a
third common feature was that it was most common for grandparents to be
invited as godparents of their children’s first children (normally parents invited
one person from each of the grandparental couples).17
Contemporary ethnography shows that, as Portuguese became increasingly
common as a language of general communication in post-colonial Maputo
during the 1980s and 1990s, the nyadine relationship came to be called xara´, this
being presently its most common name (cf. Be´nard da Costa 2002). Now this
is somewhat surprising in the light of the fact that this is a Brazilian word of
Amerindian origin (from Tupi ∗xa’ra, itself from xe rera, ‘my name’ – s.v. Dicio-
na´rio da Academia de Cieˆncias, 2001) with little circulation in Portugal.18 The
spreading of the word is probably due to the influence that spoken Brazilian
ethnos, vol. 75:3, september 2010 (pp. 323–345)

































has acquired throughout the Lusophone world in the wake of the widespread
distribution of Brazilian televised soap-operas during the same period.
In Portugal, where first names tend to be very repetitive and conservative
(cf. Pina-Cabral 2008), the notion of sharing some sort of identity with
someone who carries your first name is not relevant, as there are normally
too many people around you with the same first name. When I enquired
about it in urban Portugal, people told me that they know the word as a
Brazilian slang for ‘fellow’ – as in ‘meu xara´!’19 Again here the influence of
soap-operas is predominant.
Unlike the Iberian Peninsula, in Bahia (Brazil), the notion of namesake is very
common in everyday interaction. The xara´ is part of popular culture and has a
generalized usage that is surprising to anyone coming from Portugal. For
example, I was alerted to the relevance of the notion by the following event.
A Military Police agent at a routine roadblock in southern coastal Bahia
(2006) found out from my driver’s licence that I was called Joa˜o Paulo, where-
upon he loudly called his colleagues to see this, addressing me as his xara´ and
assuming that we shared some sort of humoristic bond as a result. He went so
far as to shed his bullet-proof vest in order to show me how my own name was
printed on his shirt. My surprise at the event was due to the fact that, in
Portugal, sharing the same first name could never have that effect. This
would, however, be characteristic behaviour between people who share the
same birthplace.
As a result, I undertook to include a question about xara´s in my normal inter-
viewing routine as part of my research on personal naming. In southern Bahia,
as it turns out, sharing someone else’s first name does not of itself trigger the
recognition of the xara´ relationship. Many men (and some women) are given
the precise same name (first names and surnames) as their father or grandfather
or uncle, adding the particles Filho/Ju´nior, Neto or Sobrinho, respectively (see
Pina-Cabral 2007a). Such people do not consider themselves their father’s or
uncle’s xara´. Nor will a person whose name has been given in honour of an
older relative consider him- or herself their xara´. In such a situation, as an infor-
mant once told me, ‘That was on purpose, it was homage. Xara´ has to be found
by chance, a kind of surprise thing’. The same lady explains: ‘If it is a matter of
definition, xara´ is a person with the same name as another. But one can apply it
to a companion, a partner. People use it in their workplace, saying things like:
‘So tell me, xara´!’ or ‘That guy is really cool, he is my xara´ – he is people of my
people’ [typical Bahian expression]. They talk like that even though they do not
share a name’. She herself has two xara´s with whom she is very close, but she


































reckons that their name is not the main reason for their friendship because it
happens to be quite a common name. But, she continues, ‘When the name is
not common, then it is something – a cause for throwing a party – since
one had not yet found another person with the same name’. Her son, for
instance, is called Marvin – a combination of her own name Ma´rcia, with her
husband’s name Vinicius (not, as one might have thought, an Anglicism).
This she claims is not a common name, so when they found someone with
the same name it was cause for joy and celebration.
In Bahia, where having a rare name is considered a value in and of itself, and
where first names are often compounds resulting from the combination of parts
of other relative’s first names, parents are very concerned not to ‘copy’ the name
choices of the other parents around them. This pre-occupation responds to an
explicitly ‘modern’ conception of personal value. Many of the people we inter-
viewed about the names they gave their children insisted on this aspect. For
example, a school teacher once told me that he regrets not being called
Danilo, a more distinguished name than his own. But, he explains, shortly
before he was born, a neighbour called her son that name, which meant that
his mother would be looked down upon if she ‘copied the name’, so he was
called Djavan, after a popular singer. She wanted a name that started with D
because his father had a daughter by his official wife, with whom he lived,
whose name started with that same letter. By creating a name series with this
other daughter, the mother of Djavan was reinforcing the siblingship between
the two children and, thus, claiming paternity rights for her own son.
In contemporary Bahia, then, we find most of the features of the nyadine/
xara´ institution of Mozambique, but they are spread between two institutions:
the xara´ and the homenagem (lit. homage – see Pina-Cabral 2007a). Following
the latter, many people receive either the same name as their parents (as in Cho-
peland, where 20% of the nyadine were the child’s own parents – Webster
2009:240) or of their grandparents. Or, they receive the initial letter or the
initial syllable of a relative’s name. In common parlance, as a result, the xara´
word is kept mostly to describe the chance event of two people finding that
they have the same name. This, to my mind, is the force behind the fascination
the Bahians have with encountering a xara´.
Such encounters are perceived as being somehow odd or humouristic pre-
cisely, because they are seen as paradoxical, as countering the dominant
notion that no person is or should be identical with any other. Luiz Fernando
Dias Duarte has identified this emphatic engagement in ‘self-affirmation’ as one
of the central axes of contemporary Brazilian personhood (Duarte & Gomes
ethnos, vol. 75:3, september 2010 (pp. 323–345)

































2008). In interviewing secondary school kids in Valenc¸a, I too was repeatedly
confronted with the way in which this feature plays a central role in differentiat-
ing modern/contemporary/consumerist modes of sociality from the locally
despised rural world – the roc¸a, a world of ‘backwardness’ (atraso), solitude
and suffering. ‘Copying’ personal names, as these students would have it, is a
sign of atraso and they laughed loudly at jokes such as: ‘The other day a
truck (pau de arara) was coming from the roc¸a (rural area). Suddenly
someone called out ‘Maria!’, so all of the women jumped out of the truck’.
Thus, the xara´ identification in Bahia must be seen as an ideological mech-
anism; that is, as playing a programmatic role. It is a mechanism which empha-
sizes the salience of a feature that contemporary Brazilian culture especially
values. There is an explicitly and emphatically ‘individualist’ tone to contempor-
ary modes of urban living in Brazil. The separation of the xara´ institution from
the homenagem institution responds precisely to this need to prevent the latter
from challenging the dominant valuation of ‘self-affirmation’ (cf. Pina-Cabral
2007a:84–6). Thus, as I argue below, ‘individualism’ must not be seen as a
given of contemporary society, but rather as something that has to be con-
stantly produced in the face of the relational nature of personhood.
What we have to remember is that the division between xara´ and homenagem
is specific to contemporary Brazilian modes of sociality. In Amerindian
societies, where the notion of xara´ originally emerged, this emphasis on
‘self-affirmation’ was not present and the institution covers generically the
same features that the nyadine institution did in Chopeland or the compadrio
in the Iberian Peninsula. The clear separation between xara´ and homenagem as
found in my contemporary Bahian material was not present there. There are
excellent ethnographic reports on the institution among the Geˆ peoples of
central Amazonia20 (Lave 1967) and among the Sanuma´ in the border with
Venezuela (a branch of the famous Yanomami – Ramos 1995:199-ff).
McCallum (2001), studying the Cashinahua on the Amazonian border with
Peru, warns that ‘It is hard to exaggerate the importance of the namesake
relationship in everyday life’ (p. 21). Namesake people are called xutanaua and
the importance of the notion lies in the folk theory that the child absorbs the
name into its body matter as a result of hearing it repeatedly pronounced. In
fact, the complex micropolitics of naming people in their village life emphasize
the intimacy and affectivity of name usage and the relational nature of name
use.21 Names ‘are attached to and define the body while the person lives, but
are safely attached to others [through the namesake institution] and repeated


































into eternity. In traditional funerary endocannibalism, an explicit function of the
rites was to detach the name from the corpse’ (McCallum 2001:26).
Boys are most often given the name of their paternal grandfathers (FF or
FFB) while girls nearly always of their maternal grandmothers (MM or
MMZ, the chichi). Due to the predominantly uxorilocal pattern of residence,
the proximity between girls and their chichi is particularly close. People have
lifelong relations with their namesakes, and this warmth extends even to com-
plete strangers who turn out to have the same name. The result is that ‘Upon
meeting a stranger, all that need be asked is his or her name, and upon the
basis of previous relationships with people of the same name, a reciprocal kin
relationship can be established. To have a true name establishes one as a relative
of every other person who also has one, irrespective of genealogical distance’
(McCallum 2001:24).22 Once again, as in the Southern Mozambican institution
of the nyadine/xara´ or in European co-parentship, this link has an effect of
closing in the local universe of relatedness, even when it is established with
strangers.
Ethnographers who speak of namesake institutions are prone to use terms
like ‘ritual’, ‘spiritual’, ‘legal fiction’, ‘fictive kinship’ or ‘metaphorical’ kinship,
even though there is nothing specifically more ritual, spiritual or fictional
about them than about other types of kinship relations. In point of fact, all of
the cases presented above show that very real and practical results issue forth
from the institution of namesakes.23 Speaking of co-parentship, Pitt-Rivers
(1977:176 n1) noted that ‘It has also been called ‘fictive kinship’ though there is
in fact nothing fictive about it [. . .] and [this] for a long time obscured its
nature which is to be opposed rather than assimilated to kinship’.
To my mind, what is being described by recourse to this ‘spiritual/fictional’
label is the fact that namesake relations supervene upon filiation, qualifying it by
contrast, but never absorbing it or diminishing its force. I imagine that is what
Pitt-Rivers had in mind when he talked of ‘opposed but not assimilated to
kinship’. Today, however, as we have come to adopt a broader view of
kinship as relatedness, we no longer need to place co-parentship outside of
kinship. The biologistic presuppositions that guided our twentieth century
anthropological predecessors and saw the elementary family as a unique found-
ing event, make little sense today. We can see kinship as a complex process of
superimposed, open-ended, criss-crossing acts of constitution of persons and of
supra-personal entities.
To conclude, all of the three general features of namesake institutions ident-
ified above seem to be observable in these Amazonian examples. The first is that
ethnos, vol. 75:3, september 2010 (pp. 323–345)

































the institution constitutes a form of alliance24 to the extent that it draws out links
between persons that affect their relations to third parties. That is, it consoli-
dates social entities by instituting relations of triangulation. The second is
that it supervenes upon filiation and conjugal alliance in a secondary manner. It
does not change the links of filiation; it further complexifies them by means
of a kind of change of angle or rotation. Finally, the third feature is that name-
sakes are nearly always associated with a turning in of the local universe of related-
ness upon itself. It can do this in two ways. Either by means of what Webster
calls the ‘inward-looking namesake’ and the Bahians call homenagem – where
homonymy within the local universe is explicitly procured. In particular, this
is often done by bringing into identification alternate generations and in that
way transforming the historical linearity of consecutive links of filiation into a
kind of cyclical oscillation of hierarchy. Or by means of what Webster calls
‘outward-looking namesakes’ and the Bahians call xara´ – that is, the homo-
nymy with strangers (either by chance or by naming young children after
them). What this does is provide the stranger with a local network of relatives.
This counters the potential openness caused by the fact that the stranger
appeals by his presence to external links.
Conclusion
In this paper I have unearthed what might seem, at first glance, to be a dif-
fusionist story. Not one of linear diffusion, but rather a complex historical
process of mutual indebtedness. I have shown how, in contemporary urban
Mozambique, we observe the coming together of an already long history of
mutual influences between local traditions (nyadine), Christian notions of relat-
edness derived from ancient Roman law (compadrio), and Brazilian notions of
sociality (xara´), in turn deeply marked by the Amerindian long-term (xutanaua).
All this is hardly surprising considering the sort of global interconnectedness
that is going on all around us in our contemporary world.
In the course of following this trajectory, however, it became clear that the
notion of namesake describes a set of institutions that are very similar to each
other throughout. A more general argument started to emerge. Webster con-
sidered that there was a large element of personal autonomy in Chopeland.
He called it ‘individualism’ because he saw it as reinforcing the role of the ‘indi-
vidual’, which he believed to be a universal feature of society, following in the
line of Mauss and Dumont (cf. Carrithers et al. 1985). By contrast, in Maputo
or Bahia today, ‘self-affirmation’ is an explicit value associated with an urge to
enact the ‘modern’ utopia (Pina-Cabral 2009b). Unlike Webster, I do not see


































this as confirming any kind of universal proclivity of humankind, since I am
prone to emphasize the dividual nature of personhood,25 but rather as part of
the ideological constitution of modernity.
The recent convoluted debates concerning dividuality by Mark Mosko and
others highlight the problems that arise from culturalist approaches that polar-
ize ‘West versus Rest’, ‘Christianity versus indigeneity’ or ‘Melanesia versus
Rest’ (see Mosko 2010:257). Although these polarities might prove to be
useful heuristic devices for ethnographic description, they should not prevent
us from seeing that partible personhood and dividuality are at the root of all
forms of higher-order consciousness. We have to free ourselves decisively
from socio-centric background assumptions. Mauss’ notion of reciprocity and
his notion of personhood are interdependent and they are the foundation for
Dumont’s influential theorizing concerning hierarchy and individualism
(cf. Pina-Cabral 2007b).
Radcliffe-Brown ends his first essay on joking relationships with a reference
to a debate he was then having with Marcel Mauss. Countering the latter’s sug-
gestion in his Essai sur le don, he argues, ‘The joking relationship is in some ways
the exact opposite of a contractual relation’ (Radcliffe-Brown 1952 (1940):103).
Thus, he raises an issue that emerged repeatedly as I wrote the above passages:
can one say that the relation of namesake, much like the relation of filiation on
which it depends, is a contractual relation? Yes, there are mutual responsibilities
that eventually emerge between the nyadine/xara´; but are they specifiable and
do they mark the onset of the relation?
While we can see what Webster might mean when he characterizes the
initial gesture (the choice of the eponym by the parents) as one that establishes
a set of responsibilities between two clearly distinguished ‘entities’; we are not
entitled to do the same when considering the other three relations involved (i.e.
maternal filiation, paternal filiation and the nyadine link). These are not relations
of contractual binomiality but of continuity and fusion – typically exemplified
in the way in which the two partners’ identities tend to merge and their rela-
tional attributes fuse. Between mother and child and father and child, the
relationship is one of co-dependence and co-responsibility; there is no recipro-
city between two partners. The same occurs with the xara´s: they merge their
interests as if they were substitutable; they contract nothing. There is no respon-
sibility26 between them; there is only co-responsibility – that which emerges from
a fusion of interests, not from a matching of interests. To that extent, Radclifffe-
Brown’s (1952 (1940):102) proposed notion of ‘consociation’ may yet prove to be
useful.
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If, in following our anthropological predecessors, one were to choose to start
our analyses from the point of view of two groups of men who exchange
women,27 relations of alliance would come to appear as binary relations
between pre-constituted collective entities. If, however, we were to approach
alliance, not from the Eurocentric perspective of the notion of ‘marriage’
(cf. Rivie`re 1971:57–74), but from the ontogenetic perspective of the person
(what I consider to be a more profitable angle), alliance would emerge as the
result of the crossing of the two gestures of filiation (maternal and paternal)
and would play a central role in attributing entity status to the person28 – a
countering of the ever re-emerging dividuality of the person.
The person does not pre-exist its social self; rather, he/she emerges as an
entity out of the links that constitute it in sociality and that, as they cross
with each other, by means of triangulation, produce and shore up the self.
The self emerges where the bonds of close identification are crossed by the
intervention of other such bonds, third persons,29 in a dynamic of plurals
(Pina-Cabral 2010b). This means that reciprocity and formal responsibility are
secondary phenomena; they are produced by the very triangulation that the
relations of alliance create. The initial asymmetry of constitutive alterity (that
is, the fact that persons emerge from other persons’ proddings) is never fully
abolished even as it gives rise through processes of triangulation to the sym-
metry of relations of reciprocal responsibility.
Thus, namesake institutions are forms of alliance because they are means for
the triangulation that gives rise to the person – both as a social person (that is,
seen from the institutional perspective) and as self (that is, as ‘arena of presence’,
cf. Johnston 2010:188ff.). In the context of the present argument, therefore, it
seems useful to stress the difference that is characteristic of social relations
between constituted selves as opposed to the original relation of deep conjunc-
tion of interests that characterizes both filiation and the namesake relation. I call
the latter co-responsibility and the former responsibility so as to stress that reci-
procity between identified persons marks responsibility while it is absent
from co-responsibility. No contract is implicit in the latter relation, as Rad-
cliffe-Brown had perceived from the very start of the discussion. Thus, the
links of filiation (paternal and maternal) and the links of namesake must be
seen as instances of co-responsibility (at least when they are first instituted).
It is in crossing each other (and other such links) that these dyadic relations tri-
angulate to make the person emerge as an entity. Central to this process is name
attribution and acceptance.


































Incest and exogamy prohibitions leading to bilateral filiation (paternal and
maternal) foster a person whose relations are always with two familial histories
(continued identities – see Pina-Cabral 1997). Later, the person is further granted
entity status by means of other relations of close proximity (such as those of sib-
lingship). The person is, thus, inserted into a generational hierarchy. But, when
they choose a nyadine/compadre/homenagem/xutanaua for their child, the
parents are transforming their friend or relative into an avatar, so to speak,
both of their child and of themselves – it is as if they were negating the hierarch-
ical arrangements produced by filiation.
In short, the namesake institutions now come to perform a similar role of
consolidation of the person as a distinct entity but they do so by means of a
rotation of the axis of reference. The relationships of filiation could be
plotted as two lines crossing along a flat surface. But now, in order to plot
the new relations constituted by the namesake, we would require a three-
dimensional picture, as the new crossing breaks across generational hierarchy.
While filiation is asymmetric in terms of gender (for the child is gendered),
the namesake institutions are asymmetric in relation to generation. In breaking
familial linearity, they further consolidate the child – they do so by an act of
crossing identifications/differentiations that raises the child above the original
familial links. The eponym is co-parent to the extent that he or she assumes a
paternal role towards the child but, at the same time, he or she is the child.
When an eponym is chosen, therefore, a further crossing occurs that performs
much the same role of affirmation of the person as that of filiation but that is
asymmetric in a different manner.
In fact, in many, many instances around the world, the eponym is a grand-
parent. Now, as our anthropological ancestors suggested, what this does is to
identify generation 1 with generation 3, generation 2 with generation 4, gener-
ation 3 with generation 5 and so forth. This breaks the linearity of descent, of
linear time, producing familial cyclicity. This is the traditional interpretation
and it does, indeed, correspond to the ‘inward-looking namesake’. But what
about the ‘outward-looking namesake’? It would seem to do the contrary.
We can see, thus, that valid as it is, this explanation remains insufficient, as it
does not take into account two important facts: (a) the namesake relationship is
typically interpersonal and intransitive; (b) the choice of eponym does not
simply produce an identification between grandchild and grandparent, it also
confuses generations by identifying the eponym both with the parent and the
child. In the Chope case, the process is even further compounded by the fact
that the MB is called GF and the ZS is called GS. But then in the Brazilian
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modern system, the homage namesake is again a case of the generational
merger.
Here we are once again reminded of Pitt-Rivers’ insight that namesake insti-
tutions supervene upon filiation. This, I imagine, could be the reason why they
are so often presented as exceptional relations – ritual, spiritual, religious, sym-
bolical, theatrical, joking or even comical, as we have seen. There is an element
of exception to the namesake institutions by reference to the personally primor-
dial links established (or, in any case, celebrated) in filiation. Families, house-
holds, neighbourhoods, consolidated friendships are breached, expanded or
supervened by the namesake relation as much as generational hierarchies are
collapsed and generational identifications melted down.
While the process of personal consolidation is furthered by this new set of
identifications and differentiations, the namesake also plays a kind of helicoı¨dal
role that opens up the path to new forms of constructive ambiguity that go
beyond the earlier familial environment. The partial questioning of the genera-
tional hierarchy (typically enshrined in Radcliffe-Brown’s famous joking-
relationships) further frees the child from the binds of filiation and, in this
way, it individuates him or her. To conclude, then, in namesake relations as
in filiation, responsibility emerges out of co-responsibility by means of a
process of triangulation.
We can return, thus, to the suggestion laid out at the beginning of the paper
that personal naming can be approached as an instance of ‘socially extended
cognition’ (Clark & Chalmers 1998). The identifications and differentiations
that are established by filiation and by the naming process are integral parts
of the very constitution of the thinking self, to the extent that they affect the
boundaries of personhood. As such, the institution of a namesake is an ‘episte-
mic action’ in the sense Clark and Chalmers (1998:2) give the expression; that is,
it ‘alter[s] the world so as to aid and augment cognitive processes such as rec-
ognition and search’. To that extent, namesakes can be seen to operate as part of
the mental process, not as mere pragmatic actions.
Notes
1. Ramos (1995), in her study of the Sanuma´, has argued that ‘The phenomenon of
namesakes is probably far more widespread than has been indicated through ethno-
graphies’ (p. 199).
2. Pronounced sharah.
3. I am personally familiar with Southern Mozambique from having lived there for
many years and, later on, having taught at Eduardo Mondlane University.
However, as I have not carried out detailed ethnographic fieldwork on these


































issues there, I have preferred to rely for this paper on three ethnographic reports
that span the twentieth century.
4. Research project ‘Names and Colours: Person and Identity in Bahia’, 2004–2008. I
am grateful to the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon and to the
Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e Tecnologia (Portugal) for subsidizing this research (cf.
Pina-Cabral & Matos Viegas 2007; Pina-Cabral 2008; 2010a). I wish to thank
Susana de Matos Viegas, Omar Ribeiro Thomaz, Ana Lu´cia Pastore Schritzmeyer,
Ulla Romeu, Ineˆs Ponte and Mo´nica Chan for their invaluable help to this project.
The paper was written at the urging of Ignasi Terradas, an already longstanding
intellectual companion. I am also grateful for comments from Susan Gal and
Dain Borges (Anthropology of Europe Seminar, University of Chicago, April
2010) and Luiz Fernando Dias Duarte (Anthropology Seminar, PPGAS, Museu
Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, June 2010). The paper has benefited also from the
useful suggestions of the anonymous referees.
5. I am grateful to Dominic Boyer for our discussions concerning this notion.
6. A later version was published as O prec¸o da sombra: sobreviveˆncia e reproduc¸a˜o social
entre famı´lias de Maputo (Be´nard da Costa 2007).
7. That is, the one who first bore the name in question.
8. Note the implication that ‘official names’ may be inherited in the ‘traditional’ way
since the ancestor in question in a ‘traditional’ form of name attribution may
have already been known by a Portuguese or English name. In discussing xara´s,
we are mostly dealing with first names (nomes pro´prios); since the inheritance of sur-
names in the family normally follows the ‘official’ system (cf. Firmino 2008:129–42;
Pina-Cabral 2008).
9. All translations of passages from books quoted in languages other than English are
by the author.
10. These are pseudonyms attributed by the ethnographer: V, a first name; FD, sur-
names, maternal and paternal, as in the contemporary Portuguese naming system
(cf. Pina-Cabral 2008:237–64).
11. We are left in doubt as to whether the word is used literally to refer to a Catholic
ritual manipulated in a ‘traditional’ manner or whether it is used metaphorically
to refer to a ceremony that might not be Christian at all.
12. His monograph resulted from long-term research in Southern Mozambique and the
Low Velt over a period of 30 years or so. The first draft appeared in French in 1898;
the definitive version (in English) appeared in 1911/1912 and was considerably re-
edited in 1927, still by the author’s own hand; a posthumous French version by
Junod’s son Henri-Philippe appeared in 1936 (Payot, Paris); the fuller English
version published in 1962, where the appendices in Latin where translated into
English is the one that I own. More recently, a second Portuguese version based
on Henri-Philippe’s French translation was published in Brazil (Usos e Costumes
dos Bantus, Ed. Omar Ribeiro Thomaz, IFCH/Unicamp, Campinas, 2009).
13. Ramon Sarro´, whom I thank for that, notes that in the Creole of Guine´ Bissau
people also attribute considerable importance to the alliance between namesakes,
assuming a substantivist conception of naming. Thus, namesakes say to each
other ‘Bo nha nome’ – ‘you are my name’.
ethnos, vol. 75:3, september 2010 (pp. 323–345)

































14. Together with the ‘principle of the unity of the sibling group’ and the ‘principle of
the unity of the lineage group’ – in ‘The study of kinship systems’ (Radcliffe-Brown
1952 (1941):87).
15. As a matter of fact, the argument of Le´vi-Strauss (1949) inLes structures e´le´mentaires de
la parente´ is that they institute processes of repeated exchange, even when they do
not specify the entities to the exchange.
16. In the specific case of Iberian co-parentship, there is a further suggestion that it
should be read as a type of alliance in the practice of people whose children are
married to each other calling themselves mutually compadres.
17. As indeed happened in my own case. Pitt-Rivers notes that the custom of choosing
the grandparents as godparents is characteristic of the north and north-western
regions of the Iberian Peninsula where household reproduction tends to follow a
more linear mode (cf. Pina Cabral 1991; Rowland 1997). In these regions, where
the house has a greater centrality in the constitution of the local community than
in the regions south of the Tagus valley described by Pitt-Rivers, such a practice
again has the effect of closing the local universe of relatedness upon itself by
means of an alliance of alternate generations.
18. As the famous etymologists Corominas and Pascoal, in fact, notes – 1987: s.v.
19. An expression used much like contemporary Black Americans use brother or bro’.
20. Note that the Xavante, as studied by Maybury-Lewis (1974 (1967)) and Lopes da
Silva (1986) seem to differ in the way this set of institutions is structured.
21. On which McCallum insists much like Alcida Rita Ramos for the Sanuma´: ‘To pro-
nounce Sanuma´ personal names in front of a stranger is considered to be in extre-
mely bad taste, offensive both to the owner of the name and to his or her close
relatives. Etiquette prescribes that one should not pronounce the other’s name in
vain. This does not mean that the Sanuma´ do not know everyone’s name or
names’ (Ramos 1995:199–200, see also Ramos 2008:59–72).
22. A pattern that is very familiar from many other societies around the world – the
Kung case foremost in anthropological lore, cf. Marshal (1957).
23. I do not deny that ethnography has registered many instances of performances
associated to alternate generations that take the form of ‘pretence’ – cf. Radcliffe-
Brown (1952 (1940):97). The point is that the close relational links that the perform-
ance brings to life are no less real because of that.
24. Note that already Radcliffe-Brown (1952 (1940):102) had classified ‘joking relation-
ships’ as one of his ‘four modes of alliance or consociation’. My argument here is
different, but interestingly correlated.
25. Not only in the Highlands of New Guinea (cf. Strathern 1988) but everywhere
(cf. Pina-Cabral 2009a, 2010a, 2010b).
26. At least in the formal, legal sense, where I am accountable for the fate of another
person before a third party.
27. As is the case with Radcliffe-Brown (1952 (1940):91): ‘For the sake of brevity, though
at the risk of oversimplification, we will consider only the husband’s relations to his
wife’s family’. Oddly enough, considering that he then goes on to adopt a view
based on relations rather than entities, Le´vi-Strauss starts from the same angle
and sticks to it right to the end. In fact, curiously enough, even his successors
seem to stick to this restrictive view of alliance.


































28. This might be called hypostatization; that is, the process of ‘to make into or regard as
a self-existent substance or person; to embody, impersonate’. Much the same
meaning as used by Symonds (quoted OED, s.v.) when he claims that ‘the products
of speculative analysis are hypostasized as divine persons’.
29. I am inspired here by Levinas’ (1999) notion of the third person: ‘Alterity’s plot is
born before knowledge. But the apparent simplicity of the relation between the I
and the you, in its very asymmetry, is yet again disturbed by the arrival of the
third person, who stands next to the other, the you’ (p. 101).
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